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A phenomenon  has  been emerging  in this coun-
try,  and  in most  Western  industrialized  countries,
The phenomenon  concerns institutions, specifically
governmental  institutions. These institutions are in
some  broad sense  failing.  Some are  failing to meet
the  objectives  that were  promised when they were
created;  others  have  failed  to  adjust  to  changing
economic  circumstances  and  national  priorities.
A  failure  of  institutions  is  a  much  more  serious
problem  than  if  the  GNP fails  to grow  for a  year
or  two  at  the  norm  economists  have  set for  it or
even  if  GNP  declines  for  awhile.  Institutional
failure  takes  longer to  emerge,  is harder  to detect
and is much more  difficult to correct.
A  significant  part  of the  institutional  problem
relates  to  government  regulation,  and  economists
have  had  something  to  say  about  this  aspect  of
the  institutional  problem.  A  hardy  group  of
economists  has  been  in  the  vanguard  of  efforts
to reform  the major economic regulatory  agencies.
Another  group  of  economists  has  been  working
toward establishing effective  quality-of-life (mainly
environmental)  regulatory  programs although  with
limited  success.  Nevertheless, relatively  few econo-
mists  have  been  working  in  the  regulatory  area in
recent  years. This  is probably  more because of the
difficulty  of institutional  analysis  than  a  lack  of
interest.  Compared  to  more  formal,  abstract
economics,  or  to  topical  issues  such  as  food  and
energy,  work in  the  theory  and  practice of regula-
tion  may be  both more  difficult  and  less exciting.
At any  rate,  it appears  to me  that  economists are
not  contributing  as much  as they  could  to under-
standing today's institutional problem.
Fortunately,  Harry Johnson addressed  some ele-
ments of the institutional problem in his usual clear-
thinking  way.  His views  address  the  big question:
whyhasWestern society seemingly turned sour in an
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era  of  general  prosperity?  According  to Johnson,
democracy  and  economic  freedom  ("capitalism"
in  the Adam Smith sense) are opposite  sides of the
same  coin.  "Political  thinkers  of the  1920's  and
1930's.  . . wondered  whether  democracy  (and
economic  freedom)  could  survive  the  strain  of
genuine  conflict  over  the  distribution  of income
and  wealth  and  the  free  market  principles  that
should  govern  it."  This concern  with class conflict
failed to foresee three subsequent developments:
"One  was  the  idea,  generated  in  the  Great
Depression  and  matured  in  wartime  management
and  thinking,  that  'capitalism'  could  not  work
without  both  extensive  macroeconomic  manage-
ment  and  intensive  provision  of  social  security
and  other  welfare  and  income  cushions  for  the
average  citizen."
The  second  development  was  increased  use of
political promises to attract marginal voting groups,
where  the  promises  had  the  effect  of extending
"the  presumed  competence  of  political  inter-
ference  and  decision  to  ever-widening  areas  of
economic life."
Third  was  the  rise  of  the  bureaucracy-made
necessary  by the  additional  government  efforts  to
manage  the  economy,  and  to  make  good  on  the
political  promises  for  a  better  life  for the voters.
"This  bureaucracy  has  gradually  become  a  politi-
cally important rival to private decision-making."
These  developments  could  be  summarized  by
the  single idea that  "economic decisions  are some-
how  too  important  to be  left to the  private  deci-
sions of those most directly affected by them."
Today's  institutional  problem  is  very  much
related  to  this  idea.  Government  intervention  in
the  economy,  and  government  programs,  have
evolved  into  an  elaborate  system.  But  the  new
government  machinery  is  being  questioned  more
and  more,  from  all  across  the  political  spectrum.
New  government  activities  have  seldom  achieved
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the  objectives  which  were  promised.  Almost  al-
ways they  have  had hidden costs from unexpected
side-effects.  Probably  most  significant,  they have
projected  government  into daily  lives  and activity
in  objectionable  ways.  There  is  no  question  that
dissillusionment  has  set  in,  but  so  far  there  is
no  substitute  philosophy  to  guide  governmental
affairs.  While  some  of  us  would  like  to think we
will  go  through  a  transformation  to  a  free-market
philosophy  similar  to  the  one  occurring  when
Adam  Smith  produced  The  Wealth of Nations, it
would be intellectually  risky  to even suggest such a
thing for lack  of real evidence.
By now  you may have  observed  that my paper
seems  only remotely  related  to my assigned topic.
I  am  supposed  to  relate  futures  markets  to  the
food  industry.  The  connections  are  fairly obvious.
Food  and  agricultural  commodities  account  for
about  three-fourths  of  total  futures trading,  mea-
sured  by  open  interest,  and  excluding  precious
metals.  Although  the  advent  of  financial
"commodity"  futures  eventually  may  reduce  that
figure,  at present  futures  markets  service  the food
industry  primarily.  It  is  also  widely  known  that
futures  are  being  used  increasingly  by  almost  all
segments  of  the  food  industry;  the  reason  is
equally  clear,  there  is  a  greater  economic  need.
Finally,  the  ultimate  justification  for  futures
trading  is  that  it  yields  a  more  efficient  (lower-
cost)  food  industry;  no  one  will  quarrel  with
that objective  though  some  may question whether
futures trading  actually serves that end.
Role of Commodity  Futures Trading Commission
Henceforth,  I  shall  discuss  the  Commodity
Futures  Trading  Commission.  This  is  my  current
work,  and  to  me  it  is  very  much  related  to  the
institutional  problem.  With respect  to competitive-
market  capitalism,  futures  markets  have  been  a
reflection  of  this  form  of economic  organization
for  a  very  long  time.  So long  as economic  policy
depends  heavily  on  markets  to allocate  resources,
futures  trading will  have  an important  function  to
perform.  On  the  other  hand,  the  imposition  of
price  rigidity  either  by  government  or  private
actions  would  reduce  the  economic  need  for
futures  trading.  With  respect  to  the  institutional
problem,  the CFTC represents  a significant increase
in government  involvement in the futures markets,
and thus is swimming against the tide of skepticism
about government  regulation.
The  CFTC  is  a  lineal  descendant  of the  Grain
Futures Administration (1922) and the Commodity
Exchange  Authority  (1936)  which  were  part  of
the  U.S.  Department  of  Agriculture.  Congress
decided  (1974)  to  transfer  regulation  of  com-
modity futures from the agricultural  establishment
to the "fourth  branch" of government where  other
independent  regulatory agencies  are located.  Such
agencies  have  two  distinguishing  features:  they
bypass the Executive  Branch and report directly to
Congress;  and  their  functions  include  aspects  of
each  of  the  three  other  branches.1 This  action
eroded  some  of the Executive  Branch's power and
authority  in agricultural  markets at a time of great
distrust  of the  executive  powers.  But  more  signif-
icant,  the  transfer  gave  new prominence to futures
trading and its regulation.
For brevity,  CFTC regulation  can  be  viewed  as
centering  on  the  organized  commodity  exchanges,
although  our  programs  extend  well  beyond  the
exchanges  per  se.2 All  ten  active  commodity  ex-
changes  are  in  various  stages  of  transition  from
their original  status as limited-membership  "clubs"
to  being  quasi-public  institutions,  still  with  re-
stricted  membership.  In effect,  the exchanges have
become  an  extension  of government (P. Johnson).
They  continue  to  operate  under  their  own  pro-
cedures  and  rules,  but  these  are  all  subject  to
potential  review  and  approval  by  CFTC.  Each
revision  of  the  original  statutory  authority  has
given  government  a  bigger  "handle"  on  the  ex-
changes,  and  the  exchanges  have  become  more
accountable  to  government,  and  presumably  the
public interest.
1ln  addition  to  its  quasi-judicial  duties,  the  CFTC
serves  rule-making  (legislative)  and  supervisory-adminis-
trative  (executive)  functions. For further discussion  of the
background  of how  the  independent  agencies  obtained
their current separation  of powers,  see Cutler and Johnson.
2The  CFTC  has  exclusive  jurisdiction  over  its regula-
tory  field  vis-a-vis other  federal (particularly the  SEC) and
state regulatory  bodies.  The  scope of its  field is not fully
determined  but  the  main  boundary  is  "futures"  rather
than "commodities."  The Act encompasses,  in addition to
all  goods  and  articles,  "all services,  rights,  and  interests"
traded  for future delivery  on organized  futures exchanges.
The  Act also  permits CFTC  to regulate cash market trans-
actions but this boundary  is unspecified in both the statute
and CFTC interpretation  of the  statute. Although forward
contracts  are exempted  at present,  there is interest in Con-
gress  that would require  CFTC  supervision.  The CFTC  is
also  responsible  for regulating commodity  options trading
as well  as so-called  "leverage"  contracts in gold  and silver.
22
June 1977Regulation and Futures  Markets
Potential of Futures Trading
Futures markets  are  an  enigma  to many people
and their economic justification is  often doubted.
However,  the  CFTC  operates  from  the  premise
that  properly  functioning  futures  markets  serve
a  valuable  economic  purpose,  although  they  are
subject  to  abuse.3 The  need  for  futures  markets
depends  on  those  factors  which  affect  price  un-
certainty for a particular commodity:  its economic
characteristics  (e.g.,  elasticities);  the  structure  of
the  private  market;  and  governmental  policy,  par-
ticularly  as  it  affects  price  behavior.  For  some
commodities  there  is simply  no  significant  econo-
mic  benefit  to  firms  from  a  futures  market.  An
example  is primary  aluminum  ingot, characterized
by  "producer"  prices  which are  relatively  rigid in
the short-run.  For others (such as steel  scrap)  there
appears  to  be  a  need,  but  the  commodity  does
not  lend  itself  to  the  specifictions  necessary  for
successful  futures  trading. 4 This  raises  one  ques-
tion:  under  today's  circumstances,  what  is  the
potential  of futures  trading? Is the futures concept
now  seriously  under-utilized,  and  if  so,  why?
Or  are  futures  used  at the  appropriate  level  in the
economy?  Specifically,  are  firms  in  the  food
industry  making  the  optimum  use  of  existing
futures  markets  and  are  there  important  new
markets  waiting  to  be  developed  for  food  com-
modities?  I suspect  futures  are  under-utilized,  but
we  do  not  know.  To  my  knowledge,  there  is  no
research  on  the  optimum  level  of futures  trading
for a commodity  beyond  the individual  firm level.
Perhaps  this  is  because  the  economic  benefits
of  futures  markets  are  not well  specified.  Quite
clearly  futures  are  useful  in  risk  management
(hedging)  by  individual  enterprises  and  in  com-
petitive  price-setting  (price  discovery)  in  com-
modity  markets,  both  of which  improve  resource
allocation. 5 However,  when  I have  looked  for  a
3Although  CFTC  has  considerable  discretionary
authority,  the  statute  is  quite  clear  on  certain  matters.
Over  the  years,  Congress  has  reaffirmed  its belief  in  the
economic  benefits  of futures  markets,  if  they  function
properly  which is the object of regulation.
Recent  research  on  characteristics  associated  with
commodities  which  have  viable  futures  trading  has been
conducted  by  Telser  and  Highinbotham  under  a  grant
from  the National Science Foundation.
5An  important  question  in  regard  to  price  discovery
is  whether  futures  markets  promote  competition  by
making  oligopolistic  and  administered  pricing  practices
more  difficult.  It  seems  safe  to  conclude  that  futures
can  help  preserve  competitive  markets,  but  can  they
make markets more competitive?
satisfactory  articulation  of  the  benefits  beyond
these  generalities,  and  failed  to  find  it,  I  have
concluded  that  more  work  needs  to  be  done  on
the  benefits  and  the  economic  significance  of
futures markets.
Certainly  the  benefits  are  nothing  like  the
$600 billion figure (value  of annual  trading volume)
commonly  quoted  in  discussions  about  the  eco-
nomic  significance  of  futures  trading.  If  dollar
figures  are  to  be  used,  they  should  be  more
sophisticated  than that one.
For  economists  to  quantify  the  benefits  of
futures  trading  would  be  a  difficult  task,  just  as
it  would  be  difficult  to  develop  meaningful
estimates  of  the  economic  value  of  the  stock
exchanges,  or  other  economic  institutions.  Some
quantification  may be feasible for futures markets,
however,  once  we  have  a more  satisfactory specifi-
cation  of the benefits.
Achievement  of  greater  price  stabilization  is
a  reason  often  given  to  justify  futures  trading.
However,  do  futures  markets  really  serve  a  price-
stabilizing  role?  The  evidence  on  this  important
question  seems  to  be  inconclusive  except  with
respect  to  seasonal  variability  which  is only  one
aspect  of  price  stability  (Gray  and  Rutledge).
Professor  Friedman's  common-sense  argument  is
often  cited  in support  of the  stabilizing  contribu-
tion  of  speculation,  defined  as  capital  invested
in  selling  and  buying  commodity  futures  by
noncommercial  interests.  His  argument  that
speculation  must  be  stabilizing  because  specula-
tors  must  be  paid  if  they  stay  in  business,  and
therefore  they  sell  at higher  prices than  they buy,
is  not  very  convincing.  For  one  reason,  available
evidence  and  conventional  wisdom  suggest  that
futures  trading  is  unprofitable  for  most  public
speculators.  Assuming  this is true  for public specu-
lators  as  a group,  the  combination  of professional
speculation  and  public  speculation  may  also  be
unprofitable.  A  second  reason  relates  to  specula-
tive  activity  by  commercial  firms.  Is  "commercial
speculation"  profitable?  Finally,  and most  impor-
tant,  while hedging  can  be  price stabilizing for the
individual  firm, does hedging itself tend to stabilize
or destabilize  market prices?
Whatever  the  benefits  of  futures,  the  costs
appear  to  be  very  low  and  this  is  one  reason  to
encourage  the  institution.  If  we  measure  "costs"
by  the  value-added  in the futures industry (largely
the revenues  of the  brokerage  firms)  the  costs  are
23
SeeversWestern J. Agr. Econ.
under  $1  billion. If we  measure  costs by  employ-
ment,  the  outside  figure  probably  would  be  no
more  than  35,000  full-time  employees  in  the
futures  industry.6 If average  salaries  are  $15,000,
this represents  a wage bill of about one-half billion,
a fairly small figure.
The CFTC is operating,  as I said, on the premise
that if a  benefit-cost  calculation  could  be  made it
would  be  favorable,  and  also  that commercial  use
of  futures  markets  is  below  optimum.  Existing
futures  contracts  could be  used  more heavily  and
the  establishment of futures for other commodities
would contribute to a more efficient economy.
Basic Tools  for Economic  Regulation
Economic  regulation  of  futures  markets  relies
on  three  basic  tools:7 first,  CFTC  must designate
(in  effect,  grant  a license)  a  commodity  contract
prior  to  actual  trading and  we periodically  review
contracts  and  could  withdraw  the  designation  at
any  time;  second,  "speculative"  limits  are
established  on  the  size  of position  and  volume  of
daily  trading  which  a  trader  can  do,  with  certain
exemptions;  third,  CFTC  monitors  daily  futures
trading  and  cash  market  developments  with  the
objective  of  preventing  activity  that  would  cause
artificial  prices,  particularly  during  the  liquida-
tion phase  of each monthly contract.
Contract  Designation and Review
The  importance  of  a  "good  contract"  cannot
be  over-emphasized.  Proper  delivery  specifications
is  usually  the key  ingredient.  Contracts  which  fall
short  of the  good contract  standard are  vulnerable
to  squeezes,  manipulations  or  congestions  which
cause  them  to  send  out inaccurate  price  signals  or
discourage  commercial  use.  A  good contract  may
be  difficult  or  impractical  to  design  for  some
6About  25,000  individuals  are  registered  with CFTC
as  floor  brokers,  account  executives  of brokerage  firms
(22,000),  trading  advisers  and commodity pool operators.
Information  from  registration  records  indicates  an  ex-
tremely  high  turnover  rate  of  around  25  percent  each
year for "account executives."
7Further  discussion  is  given  in  the  report  of  the
Advisory  Committee  on  the  Economic  Role  of Contract
Markets.  The remainder  of this paper draws upon  analysis
and  recommendations  outlined  in  that report.  An  earlier
analysis  by  Allen  Paul  reaches  conclusions  similar  to  the
Advisory  Committee's.
commodities,  while  for others  obsolescence  is  the
problem.  The  New  York  Mercantile  Exchange
potato  contract  is  one  which  was  allowed  to
develop  some  serious  flaws,  and  is  now  being
revised  under  CFTC  supervision.  The  potato
futures  contract  became  obsolete  by  changes  in
potato  markets  and  marketing  practices.  If  it
had  been kept up-to-date with commercial practices
in  the  industry,  the  severe  problem with  contract
defaults  might have  been  avoided.  Of course,  con-
tract  defaults are  extremely rare in futures trading.
Price  aberrations  are  more  common  and  keeping
the  specifications  of a  futures contract  consistent
with current  marketing practices reduces  the prob-
ability  of  such  disturbances.  The  old  turkey  fut-
ures  contract  was  also  a defective contract.  Unlike
potatoes,  where trading  often has been very heavy,
there  was  virtually  no  trading  in  turkeys.  It  was
inactive  even  though  firms  in the  turkey  industry
have  stated  that  they  need  a viable  futures market
to manage  risks of price  change in their operations.
No  contract  is  perfect  but  many  are  better  than
these.  The  design  of better  contracts  or  new con-
tracts  is  a  worthwhile  endeavor  and  economists
who  specialize  in  the  applied  economics  of com-
modity  markets  are  in  a  position  to  help  in
these efforts.
Although  the  CFTC  places  high  priority  on
proper contract specifications,  we have not required
that  either  new  or  existing  (inactive)  contracts
demonstrate  conclusive  evidence  that  they  are  or
will  be  utilized  for  hedging  and  price  discovery
purposes.  We  are  concerned  that  this  could  turn
into a  "restricted  entry"  policy  that would  stifle
experimentation  and  innovation.  Nor  does  our
current  policy  provide  any  protection  to existing
contracts from  the emergence of competing futures
contracts.  That  is,  we  are  not  greatly  concerned
about  proliferation  of  too  many  contracts  in  the
same  commodity.  For  example,  if  an  exchange
wanted  to  trade  live  cattle,  which  is  now  traded
only  on  the  Chicago  Mercantile  Exchange,  we
would  not  be  inclined  to  oppose  it.  If CFTC  had
the  wisdom  of  Solomon,  we  could  decide  which
exchange  could  and  should  trade  what.  But
government  regulatory  agencies  do  not  have
such  wisdom,  in  my  view.  Indeed, to become  con-
cerned  about  so-called  proliferation  of  futures
trading with its attendant  danger  of "thinning the
market"  is  a potential  regulatory  pitfall  which, by
reducing  competition,  would  discourage  innova-
24
June 1977Regulation and Futures  Markets
tions,  favor  the  status  quo,  and  protect  existing
exchanges.  There  is  ample  evidence  of  what
happens  when  a  regulatory  agency restricts  entry
into an economic activity.
This  is  not  to  say  that  the  hard-line,  pro-
competition  policy  on  proliferation  is  a  black  or
white  question  for  economists;  few  of  the  issues
CFTC  faces are.  Indeed,  several  thoughtful econo-
mists have questioned  my view on proliferation of
contracts.  One  reason  is  that  a  degree  of protec-
tionism  is  justified  to  provide  an  incentive  for
innovation;  the  theory  underlying  patent  law
policy  should  apply.  Again,  this  subject  deserves
more  analysis  by  economists  interested  in  com-
modity markets.
Speculative Limits and Hedging
The  use  of "speculative"  limits  as  a  regulatory
tool goes  back to  1938.  Today  the  CFTC imposes
limits  for  grains,  soybeans,  potatoes,  eggs  and
cotton.  Commercial  firms  are  exempted  from
these  limits  to  the  extent  that  their  transactions
qualify  as  bona  fide  hedging  according  to  the
CFTC  definition.  The justification  for speculative
limits  probably  always  was  more  political  than
economic  and  today  they  are a fairly crude  regula-
tory  tool and should be phased out. If this is done,
there  would be little  need for CFTC to define hedg-
ing for exemption purposes.
For economists I suspect  the concept of hedging
is  more  interesting  then  the efficacy of speculative
limits.  Whether or not the CFTC retains speculative
limits,  and  thus  needs  to have  a regulatory  defini-
tion,  hedging  as  an  economic  concept  will  remain
important.
The  most  meaningful  definition  of hedging  is
Holbrook  Working's  concept  that  a  hedge  is  a
"temporary  substitute  for  a  future  cash  tran-
saction."  I like  this  definition  because  it  stresses
the  role  futures  markets  ought  to  play  relative
to  cash  markets.  Futures  are  auxiliary  or  sup-
plementary  and  should  not  become  a  permanent
merchandizing  substitute  for  spot  or  forward
transactions.
The  Working  definition  seems  to  cover  most
legitimate  uses  of  futures  markets. This  new  con-
cept  needs to become  conventional  thinking more
than it  is today.  Under  the Working definition the
distinction  between  hedging  and  speculation  is
not very significant.
From  a  regulatory  standpoint,  the  distinction
will  be  significant  as  long  as  speculative  limits
are  employed.  The  question  is  how  expansive  to
make  the  definition;  i.e., how  many  categories  of
temporary  substitutes to exempt?  Everyone  would
exempt  transactions where  a price commitment has
been  accepted  in  the  cash  market,  and  a  futures
position  is  taken  to  offset the price risk  associated
with  that commitment.  Here  the  futures  is  a  tem-
porary substitute  for a subsequent  cash transaction
that  will  take  place where  the price  on the  original
cash transaction  is known.  This is classical  hedging.
The  second concept is where  a firm uses futures
to  forward-price  a  contemplated  cash  transaction
and  there  is  no  existing  counterpart  cash  trans-
action  with  a  price  risk.  Consider  a  small  meat
packer  who  prices  his  cattle  purchases  over  the
next three  months but  does  not know the price at
which  he  will  sell  the  meat.  Sometimes  this  is
called  anticipatory  hedging,  and  it  conforms  to
Working's  definition.  However,  does it differ from
speculation  and  should  it be exempt  from specula-
tive  limits?  Of course,  if the  meat  packer  had  a
market  for  his  meat at  an assured  price,  it  would
become  classical  hedging.  Consider  another  ex-
ample.  Two firms each purchase  soybean  meal  as a
production  input.  Each  "hedges"  its soybean meal
requirements  by  use  of  the  futures  markets  as  a
temporary  substitute  for subsequent  procurement
of soybean  meal in the cash market.  One  firm sells
the product  of the meal into a volatile  market (say,
protein  supplement  for  livestock  feed)  and  the
other  sells the  product  (say, brand name  pet food)
into  a market  with  fairly  stable  prices.  Under  the
Working  concept,  both  are  hedging  even  though
taking  a futures  position  seems  to  raise  risks  for
one and reduce it for the other.
As  a  practical matter, hedging  policy  is  unique
to  the  firm.  Some firms  do  not undertake  futures
positions  in  response  to  particular  cash positions;
their  operations  may  be  too  complex. 8 A  large
grain  trading  company  might  be  buying  and
selling  grain  all  over  the  world;  This information
reaches  a  central  decision  center  and  the  firm
could  take  a  futures  position  based  upon  its
consolidated  exposure  and,  I  am  sure,  also  upon
its (speculative)  view, of the market.
8By  the  same  token,  some  firms do  operate by taking
futures  positions  primarily  in  response  to particular  cash
positions;  such  a  firm does not relate its aggregate  futures
position  to its aggregate  cash position.
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I  am  doubtful  whether  there  can  be  a  satis-
factory  universal  definition  of  hedging  for CFTC
purposes  that  would  fit  all  commodities  and  all
legitimate  business  uses  of  the  futures  markets.
If you  ask  a  commercial, you will find that "hedg-
ing is what commercials  do in the futures markets."
Many  commercials  use  futures in just that way,  as
an enterprise  to make money alongside  the related
cash  business.  Several  New  York  exchanges  pro-
posed that  CFTC define  hedging  essentially  as the
activity  of commercials,  and  this  may  be  a  good
way  to define  hedging.
Market Surveillance
The  limitations  of speculative  limits  will make
the  CFTC's  daily  surveillance  of  the  markets  in-
creasingly  important.  The  liquidation  of  expiring
contracts  is where  problems usually  show  up,  and
this is  where  our economic regulation  of the  mar-
kets  will  concentrate.  As  you reach  the  final  days
of  trading,  the  traditional  fixed  limits  serve  very
little  purpose  and the  distinction  between hedging
and  speculation  becomes weaker  and weaker from
both  a  regulatory  and  economic  standpoint. How
CFTC  defines hedging  may be important  for other
reasons,  but  to  achieve  the  objective  of  accurate
prices  and  orderly  markets  I  suspect  its  signifi-
cance has been overstated.
Further Study  and Research
Let  me  conclude  with  several  policy  questions
which,  to answer to the Commission's  satisfaction,
require  further  study  and  research.  This is  by no
means an exhaustive  coverage.
Economic benefits and optimal use of futures.
The  importance  of  a  better  specification  of eco-
nomic  benefits  and  optimal  use of futures  has al-
ready  been  discussed.  Conceptually,  what are  the
economic  functions  (benefits)  of  futures  markets
to  the  economy?  To  what  extent  do  existing
markets serve  those conceptual functions?
Price behavior and speculation.  What  are  un-
desirable  forms of price  behavior?  In what ways, if
any,  do  futures  markets  provide  an  avenue  for
such unwarranted  price  behavior?  What  is the role
of  speculation  of various  types?  E.g.,  what would
futures  trading  by  uninformed  public  speculators
contribute  to the functioning  of futures  markets?
Are waves of public speculation  a serious problem?
What  about  the  professional  floor  trader  (the
"scalper")  who  trades  back  and  forth  during the
day but does not carry  a position from day-to-day?
What  about  professional  traders  who  do  take
positions?  Have  portfolio  adjustments  between
futures  and  other  forms  of  investment  been  a
cause of commodity price fluctuations? What about
tax-spreading?
Some  of  these  familiar  questions  have  been
studied.  But  they  remain  important  questions
because  they  concern  CFTC's  primary  statutory
mandate  to  avoid  artificial  prices  and  excessive
speculation.  They  are  closely related to the skepti-
cism of futures markets, especially the justification
for  intraday  and  day-to-day  price  movements.
Research  in  this  area  has  been  limited  simply
because  data were  not available. 9 This will become
a  fruitful  area because  the CFTC will soon require
exchanges  to keep better  records on  the  sequence
of trades  during  a  day.  One  of our purposes  is to
conduct  and  sponsor  studies  on  trading  activity
and price  behavior.
Should  CFTC care about price  levels?  Aside
from price stability, there is a large policy  question
about  whether  CFTC  should  care  about  price
levels  as  these  may  be  affected  by  speculation  or
other  influences.  Should  we  be  completely  price
neutral,  which  is  our  current  stated  policy?
While  not really an issue today,  whether CFTC has
an  attitude regarding  price  levels  could be a major
issue  in  years  to  come.  In  London,  where  there
has been little regulation  of commodity exchanges,
the  Bank  of  England  is  beginning  to  monitor
markets more  closely  and  some  of this attention
has  taken  the  form  of restricting  access  in  order
to reduce  prices  judged  to be  unduly  high. There
is  concern  in  London,  as  there  is  here,  about
access  to  futures  markets  by  government  trading
agencies,  although  this is  more  a matter  of poten-
tial  disruption-manipulation  than  affecting  price
levels.
The  basic  issue  is  wheather  restricting access to
futures  markets,  or  adding  governmental  activity,
9Recent  research  by  Mann  and  Heifner  raises  ques-
tions  about  the day-to-day  pricing  efficiency  of futures
markets.  The  markets  do  not seem  to absorb  new  infor-
mation promptly.
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serves  any  useful  purpose.  To  influence  com-
modity  prices  by trying  to regulate  futures prices
may  be  equivalent  to  controlling  the  weather  by
adjusting barometers.
While  CFTC  has  awesome  regulatory  powers,
they  would,  I  suspect,  prove  to  be  very  meager
if  used  to  regulate  commodity  prices.  For  the
CFTC  to  have an attitude  on price levels, it would
be  necessary  to  have  an  activist  policy  in  cash
markets.  The  law  may  permit  this  kind  of  role,
and  a  case  can  be  made  that  in  order  to  foster
and  protect  competitive  price  discovery  the
CFTC  should  have  an  active  antitrust  posture,
presumably  jointly  with  other  government
agencies.  The  Commission  does  not  take  such an
expansive  view  of  its  role,  but  such  an  attitude
might become appropriate  sometime.
Market  participation.  Agricultural  producers
and  smaller  firms  make  limited  use  of  futures
markets.  Is  this  because  the  product  is  poorly
designed  to  meet  their  needs?  Is  it  because  of
attitudes  which may  be based on bad experiences?
Is  it  because  of  the  "knowledge  investment"
required  to  start  and  maintain  positions  in  the
markets?  I  believe  easier  access  to  futures  mar-
kets  by  smaller firms  is  desirable  and  ways should
be  pursued  to  facilitate  their  participation.  A
brand  new  market  intermediary  may  be  needed
to  accomplish  this  objective,  or  new  concepts
such  as  satellite  futures  markets  might  be  the
answer.
Third  World  Countries  are  also potential  users
of  futures  markets.  Both exporters  and  importers
are  expressing  interest  in  how  they  might  use
futures,  mainly  to  forward-price  their  purchases
and  sales. This  is  one way  an  individual  exporting
country  can  stabilize  its  commodity  foreign
exchange  earnings  even  without  stabilization
schemes  for  the  entire  market,  or  an  importing
country  can  lock-in  some  share  of  its  import
bill  for  internal  economic  planning  purposes.
The  feasibility  of  using  the  futures  markets  in
lieu  of  commodity  buffer  stocks  to  stabilize
commodity  prices  is  an  idea  which  surfaces  fre-
quently and deserves critical review.
Conclusion
I am a skeptic of government regulation because
in  practice  it  is  sometimes  misguided  and often
overdone.  The CFTC is being  established when the
number  of  skeptics  is  growing.  I  consider  this
fortunate  because  we  are  constantly  reminded  of
the  limitations  of government,  and  the  need  to
concentrate  our  resources  where  they  will  do
the most good.
In the long-run, better understanding and regula-
tion  of futures  markets  from  an  economic  stand-
point will be  an important  determinant of CFTC's
effectiveness.  Establishing  a  sound  research  and
regulatory  philosophy  in  the  early  years  of  the
Commission will be essential.
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